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For over twenty years, the CAP has been 
interpreted and implemented differently 
across the UK’s four nations. Since the EU 
Referendum result, the UK Government has 
repeatedly promised a ‘Green Brexit’, whereby 
the UK would learn from the mistakes of the 
CAP and replace it with policies putting the 
‘environment first’. But what would this mean 
in practice, and are current developments 
going in the right direction?
This report, commissioned by the Soil 
Association, aims to set the bar for a Green 
Brexit in food and farming. To do so, it first 
sets out the context in which the UK will be 
determining policy. The CAP has shaped 
UK agricultural policy for decades and will 
continue to impact farming here due to the 
close competition between the two markets. 
Second, it highlights the political promises 
made about post-Brexit agricultural policy. 
What have ministers at UK level promised 
they will do for food and farming, and how 
does this differ from on-going debates in the 
devolved administrations? Third, it examines 
what we can expect trade in agricultural 
products to look like after Brexit, including 
the rules and tariffs that will apply. 
While the CAP has historically been linked to 
a deterioration in soil, air and water quality, 
habitat clearance, loss of biodiversity and 
the degradation of ecosystems, recent CAP 
reforms have attempted to ‘green’ agriculture. 
These reforms have made  it possible for 
EU Member States to pursue ambitious, 
differentiated yet complementary policies 
for farming and food, alongside the CAP – 
belying the policy’s one size fits all image. 
The report reviews five such examples of 
innovative domestic policies in Spain, Italy, 
France and Denmark, and how the UK could 
adopt and adapt them.  
Taken together, our review of the policy 
context and good practices across the 
EU leads us to draw some key take-home 
messages. Rethinking agriculture requires 
action beyond the silo of agricultural policy 
(incorporating education, land use rights and 
the whole supply chain) and the adoption of 
a holistic approach where food and farming 
policy are co-designed. Such a change will 
not happen overnight and requires long-
term targets to secure investment and build 
collaboration. Finally, profound policy change 
does not necessarily require centralisation. 
Instead, a shared policy framework can 
accommodate and benefit from local 
divergence and innovation. 
Executive Summary 
As the UK prepares to leave the European Union (EU), the 
future of agriculture is high on the political agenda. Since 
joining the EU, UK agriculture has been influenced by the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
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During the EU Referendum campaign, Vote 
Leave highlighted the replacement of the CAP 
and changes in environmental regulations as 
a key opportunity for the UK if it left the EU:
‘EU regulations make life hard for the 
UK’s farmers. If we have the courage to 
Vote Leave and take back control, we 
would be free to think again and could 
achieve so much more for farmers and our 
environment’.
George Eustice, former Farming Minister and 
Vote Leave lead on agriculture (2016)1  
Since the Referendum result in June 2016, 
the UK Government and the leadership of the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) have committed to creating 
a simplified, environmentally-friendly 
agricultural policy after Brexit. This ‘Green 
Brexit’ rhetoric from the UK Government has 
focussed on the environmental harm caused 
by the CAP and the opportunities of leaving 
the EU, especially for reducing red tape and 
regulatory constraints:
‘Leaving the EU gives us the opportunity 
to improve our environment, to take leaps 
forward, to ensure that over a period of 
time—and again stressing that this is a 
smooth transition—we will have the chance 
to make sure that our environmental 
legislation focuses on what is right for the 
UK rather than on necessarily the lowest 
common denominator for 28 EU Member 
States’.
Andrea Leadsom, former Defra Secretary 
(2016)2 
Since 2016, the push from the Westminster 
Government to overhaul agricultural policy 
has led to the publication of the Health and 
Harmony consultation, the draft Agriculture 
Bill and the Future for Food, Farming and the 
Environment policy paper in 2018. The Health 
and Harmony consultation states: 
‘Now we are leaving the EU we can design 
a more rational, and sensitive agriculture 
policy which promotes environmental 
enhancement, supports profitable food 
production and contributes to a healthier 
society’.3  
The UK 25 Year Environment Plan published 
in January 2018 contends that Brexit offers 
a ‘once-in-a-lifetime chance to reform our 
agriculture and fisheries management, how 
we restore nature, and how we care for our 
land, our rivers and our seas’.4 
 
The devolved administrations took on board 
similar objectives for a green farming future 
and released consultations on these issues in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Brexit has indeed put agriculture and the 
environment back on the political agenda 
across the UK, offering a key window of 
opportunity for change. However, new 
policies do not necessarily mean progress, 
or that the promised ‘Green Brexit’ will be 
delivered. To seize that opportunity, policy 
makers must deliver on their commitments, 
pay careful attention to the challenges posed 
by devolution and be open to lessons from 
innovative approaches in other countries 
(many of them carried out in the EU27 using 
existing flexibility provisions within the CAP).
Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has played a 
significant role in shaping farming policies and practices 
across Europe; domestic ambitions have also been an 
equal factor. A vision for food and farming that delivers 
a ‘Green Brexit’ must learn from, and seek to improve 
upon, experiences across the EU. Achieving an inclusive, 
environmentally-friendly and sustainable food and farming 
system must be the priority. I.  
The shadow of the  
Common Agricultural Policy
This report seeks to inform the design 
of sustainable agricultural policy after 
Brexit. Section I summarises the long-term 
impacts the CAP has had and will have 
on British farming. Section II reviews the 
commitments on agriculture made during 
the referendum campaign and subsequently 
by the UK Government and the devolved 
administrations. Section III analyses the 
international context in which post-Brexit UK 
policy will be embedded and the important 
role played by trade agreements. Section 
IV presents five innovative EU agricultural 
policies and practices on fair trading, social 
agriculture, agroecology, agroforestry and 
organic food procurement. Finally, Section 
V provides concrete recommendations for 
‘setting the bar’ in a way that makes the 
delivery of a ‘green farming’ Brexit in the UK 
more likely.
While the future UK-EU relationship in other 
policy areas remains uncertain (in fields such 
as trade, migration or environment), the 
picture for agriculture and fisheries outside 
the EU is relatively clear: new domestic 
policies will be required to replace EU 
frameworks.
As the UK debates future agricultural 
policies in Westminster and the devolved 
administrations, it is key to remember that 
domestic agricultural policy development 
is taking place in the shadow of the CAP. 
This shadow can best be understood as 
comprising three elements: the shadow of 
the past, the shadow of the present and the 
shadow of the future. In addition, farming 
and rural areas are affected by many other 
policies. Some of these additional policies—
such as land use, planning, health and food 
policy—have remained overwhelmingly 
the competence of the UK and devolved 
governments during EU membership. Other 
areas—such as trade policy—are currently EU 
competences and may be repatriated to the 
UK after Brexit.
Since the UK joined the European Economic Community 
in 1973, the CAP has provided an overarching framework 
for its agricultural policy. This is set to change, with the UK 
planning to leave the CAP after Brexit.
soilassociation.org6 7REEN BREXIT
a.  The shadow of the past:  
The Europeanisation of agricultural policy-making
Since its inception, the CAP has set many 
of the parameters for what is possible and 
acceptable when regulating the farming 
sector in EU Member States. While some of 
these rules are international, not European, in 
origin (such as the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Agriculture) the EU has largely 
decided how they have been applied and 
interpreted. This centralisation of power has 
consequences for policy-making capacity. 
Agriculture policies have largely been 
developed in Brussels and implemented in 
the Member States. As the UK leaves the EU, 
it will need to rebuild its capacity for policy 
development, not simply implementation and 
enforcement. This requires a profound shift 
in staffing, both an increase in the number 
of civil servants working in the relevant 
department and the recruitment of more 
policy experts, (as is already on-going in 
Defra). Policy-makers must also develop new 
approaches to engaging with civil society 
(which was very active in reforming the CAP 
over the last twenty years) and engaging the 
different administrations of Westminster, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Future UK policy will also need to address 
the environmental impacts of agriculture. By 
encouraging the intensification of farming, 
the CAP has historically led to a deterioration 
in soil, air and water quality, land clearing, loss 
of biodiversity and the degradation of marine, 
freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems.5 
 
The CAP has been reformed many times, 
but in terms of its environmental impact 
the key reforms remain that of the 1990s 
and early 2000s, which saw the end to 
‘coupled payments’ linked to production 
level and attempts at a ‘greening of the CAP’ 
to support sustainable agriculture. CAP 
‘greening’ is visible under both its pillars. 
Under Pillar 1, direct payments to farmers 
are subject to cross-compliance and specific 
greening requirements. Under Pillar 2, rural 
development programmes (RDPs) aim to 
improve the social and environmental effects 
of agriculture by enhancing social cohesion 
and sustainability in rural areas, particularly 
through the development of agri-environment 
schemes.6 
 
Despite these reforms and subsequent signs 
of progress, the CAP has failed to reverse 
its negative overall impact on the UK’s 
environment. Moving forward, the EU will 
need to further reform the CAP. If the UK is  
to deliver a ‘Green Brexit’ in agriculture, the  
UK should continue to be prepared to learn 
from the CAP (both its positive and  
negative aspects). 
b.  The shadow of the present:  
Devolution and internal UK policy divergence
While the CAP started as a one-size-fits-
all policy, today it offers a wide degree of 
flexibility to better accommodate the different 
preferences of the EU Member States and 
the diversity of the European farming sector. 
Crucially, this differentiation has not only 
taken place between countries but also within 
them (including within the UK). In the UK, 
there is not one but four implementations of 
the CAP for Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales 
and England. 
 
The starting point for post-Brexit policy is 
therefore heterogeneity: heterogeneity of the 
farming system and ecosystems across the 
four nations7 , the resulting agricultural and 
environmental focus points within the RDPs, 
the economic importance of the agri-food 
sector, the political parties’ preferences, and 
policy competence. 
Examples of differentiation 
within the 2014-2020 
Common Agricultural 
Policy in the UK and Ireland
Source: Allen et. al (2014) CAP Reform 2014-20: EU Agreement and Implementation in the UK and in Ireland, 
Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service. 
Minimum claim size:  
England and Wales have a minimum claim size of 5 hectares, while Northern 
Ireland and Scotland have chosen 3 hectares. Outside of the UK, Ireland has 
chosen to have no minimum claim size.
Coupled support:  
Northern Ireland, Wales and England have no coupled payments while 
Scotland and Ireland have chosen to re-introduce these payments in some 
cases (for beef calves and hill sheep in Scotland).
Capping payment size:  
Northern Ireland and Ireland cap direct payments at €150,000. In Wales and 
Scotland, the caps are much higher (€300,000 and €500,000 respectively). 
England has no cap. 
Agri-environment-climate payments:  
These payments represent 21% of Northern Irish and 25% of Welsh Rural 
Development Funds compared to 19% in Scotland, 69% in England and 38% in 
Ireland.
Box 1
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II.
Political commitments to 
policy change in the UK
The political commitments that have built the ‘Green Brexit’ 
narrative have emphasised the opportunity to freely amend 
UK food, farming and fisheries policies outside the EU. 
Delivering high food, farming and environmental standards 
in a devolved policy area with uncertain international trade 
outcomes is a challenge that current policy-makers have yet 
to resolve.
a. Agriculture during the referendum campaign
‘The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is an expensive, wasteful programme 
that dates back to the 1960s. […] British 
farmers would continue to be supported 
after we Vote Leave. […] Because it pays 
much more into the EU budget than we 
get out, Britain would have sufficient 
funds to continue supporting our farmers 
- and could even increase funds. […] 
The thousands of badly designed EU 
regulations that aim to control everything 
farmers do would go. […] If we vote to 
leave and take control, elected Ministers 
will be able to make the changes needed 
and put in place new policies to help 
farmers manage risk, boost their returns 
and reward the work farming does for the 
environment’.
Vote Leave, Farming, Fisheries and Food 
Briefing10 
Vote Leave emphasised farming, fisheries 
and food during the referendum campaign. 
The pro-Leave group Farmers for Britain 
called Brexit a ‘once-in-a-lifetime chance for 
significant and much-needed change in the 
agricultural industry’.11  Vote Leave briefings 
argued that the CAP was burdensome, 
wasteful and expensive, and that the UK 
could ‘easily continue to support farmers’ 
with subsidies after Brexit’.12  In addition, a 
key selling point was the ability to ‘take back 
control of the regulation of agriculture’ by 
reducing burdensome regulation, singling 
out environmental cross-compliance 
requirements in the CAP as well as EU 
laws on pesticides, genetically modified 
organisms, and crop rotation.13   In a separate 
publication on the EU single market, 
environmental policy was included in a list 
of the “most burdensome EU regulations”, 
including agriculture-related regulations on 
animal welfare, nitrates and pesticides.14 
c.  The shadow of the future:  
CAP reform and future constraints on UK policy 
Finally, the CAP casts a shadow on future 
policy development. The CAP is not static – it 
is in the midst of yet another round of policy 
reform. This means that even if the UK were 
to keep its farming support system constant, 
the EU would not. Policy divergence is a 
given.
This divergence is important because farmers 
in the EU and UK will be in direct competition 
in UK, EU and international agricultural 
markets. If EU support is more generous, or 
if it incentivises different forms of farming, 
it will have a knock-on effect on UK farmers. 
One way of evaluating how the future CAP 
will develop is to consider the role of the UK 
in past reforms of the policy.8  The UK has 
played a major role in greening the CAP, 
leading a coalition of like-minded states such 
as, at times, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark. In the mid-1980s, it was the first 
Member State to adopt agri-environment 
schemes and was also a pioneer in cross-
compliance. UK environmental charities 
have also played a central role in civil society 
campaigns for a more environmentally-
friendly CAP and have long called for the 
CAP to better fit a ‘public money for public 
goods’ approach that would see funding go 
towards public goods (i.e. environmental or 
ecosystem services) such as clean air and 
healthy soil. 
Removing the UK from future CAP 
negotiations creates a risk of decreased 
ambition at a time when the EU needs to step 
up climate action and its approach to other 
linked environmental challenges such as 
biodiversity loss, water and air pollution. The 
ongoing CAP reform proposal has raised a 
number of challenges. First, it offers Member 
States more flexibility. While flexibility can 
lead to innovative practices being developed, 
it also comes with a risk that many Member 
States will reduce environmental ambition. 
Second, the reform continues to adopt 
vague environmental objectives and generic 
indicators which makes it difficult to properly 
implement commitments and easy to shirk. 
Third, it continues to move away from rural 
development funding despite evidence that 
this funding has been best at achieving 
environmental aims.9  The current CAP 
reform outcome is still very uncertain. A 
new European Parliament, with a different 
political balance, will form in 2019 and will 
need to continue the reform work started 
by the current Parliament and Council of 
Ministers. However, during the 2013 reform, 
the legislative process further weakened the 
European Commission’s proposal and recent 
votes in the Agriculture Committee in April 
2019 appear to show history repeating itself. 
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from income support and towards ‘public 
money for public goods’ could be detrimental 
to the survival of farmers, especially small, 
family farms which are heavily reliant on 
EU direct payments.25 Further, the new 
governmental policy on farming aims to 
adopt a holistic approach, as indicated in 
the Agriculture Bill, where agriculture and 
the environment are no longer perceived as 
competing priorities but as ‘two sides of the 
same coin’. 26 
Non-regression of environmental 
standards vis-à-vis trade
‘…people know when they’re buying British 
they’re buying food which is guaranteed 
to be high quality and more sustainable. 
That’s why it would be foolish for us to lower 
animal welfare or environmental standards 
in trade deals, and in so doing undercut our 
own reputation for quality. We will succeed 
in the global market place because we are 
competing at the top of the value chain not 
trying to win a race to the bottom’.
Defra Secretary Michael Gove, Oxford 
Farming Conference 201827 
Michael Gove has consistently stated that 
the ratification of trade deals after Brexit will 
not result in a reduction of environmental 
and animal welfare standards.28  In addition, 
the draft UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement 
committed the UK not to lower the level of 
protection provided by ‘common standards’ 
generally in line with the EU environmental 
acquis. 29  Dynamic alignment with the 
EU would also maintain high standards. 
However, ongoing discrepancies between 
Gove’s statements (‘achieving a higher 
level of environmental protection’) and 
those of International Trade Secretary Liam 
Fox related to allowing imports with lower 
environmental and animal welfare standards 
have raised concerns and uncertainties as to 
the future of environmental protection across 
the UK. 
Tense relationships between the 
UK Government and the devolved 
administrations can be seen with the passage 
of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
and now the draft Agriculture Bill. Scotland 
refused to grant consent to the devolution 
aspects of the Withdrawal Act (as it is entitled 
to do so under the Sewel Convention30 ) but 
the Act was passed anyway.
Agriculture and environmental protection 
are devolved powers. There are currently 
four heterogenous agricultural policies 
across the UK to take into consideration. 
In 2018, England, Wales, Northern Ireland 
and Scotland set the scene for their future 
agricultural policies in consultation 
documents. The UK Government has since 
followed up its policy with the Agriculture Bill. 
The Agriculture Bill is seen by some 
commentators and the Scottish Government 
as a means of recentralising powers in 
Westminster to the detriment of the devolved 
administrations, especially with Clause 28 
of the Bill related to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture. Clause 28 gives broad powers 
to the Secretary of State to: (i) conclusively 
determine the classification of financial 
support across the UK; (ii) set limits on 
spending for the whole of the UK; (iii) set 
individual ceilings of support across the 
devolved administrations; (iv) create different 
ceilings of financial support in each devolved 
administration; and (v) fix the upper limits 
spent under specific programmes by each 
devolved administration – despite the 
Agreement on Agriculture of the World Trade 
Organization not imposing any such limits.31 
Clause 28 also exceeds what is required in the 
Agreement on Agriculture.32  
The utilisation of reserved powers on finance, 
trade and compliance with international 
agreements recentralises financial support for 
farmers and the design of support schemes 
across the UK. The issue of concurrent 
powers between central government 
and the devolved administrations has 
been exacerbated by the development of 
agricultural polices across the UK.33 
The similarities, differences and concerns 
raised by the different policies are explored 
in Box 2. The policies place at their heart the 
twin aims of improving productivity and 
delivering public goods/ecosystem services. 
Thus, the old habit of increasing production 
of food, feed, fuel and fibre remains present. 
c. The Agriculture Bill and devolution
‘Post EU exit the UK will be an 
environmental superpower’.
Defra Secretary Michael Gove, House of 
Commons January 201915 
Since the referendum, UK Government 
officials have made many public statements 
about the shape of UK agricultural policy 
after Brexit. When thinking about key 
governmental Brexit promises made in 
relation to food and farming, three are 
central: the commitments to ‘take back 
control’, to deliver a ‘Green Brexit’ that 
improves the environment and to ensure that 
international trade negotiations do not lead to 
a weakening of environmental standards.
Taking back control
‘For too long, a bureaucratic system, which 
tries to meet the needs of 28 different 
Member States, has held farmers back. 
But now, we have the chance to design a 
domestic successor to [the] CAP that works 
for all of you, rather than the entire European 
Union’. 
Defra Secretary Andrea Leadsom, Oxford 
Farming Conference 201716 
The EU referendum slogan ‘taking back 
control’ has been a key organising idea for 
the UK Government over the past three years. 
For agriculture, this idea has resulted in a 
willingness to move away from the CAP, which 
is seen as an overly complex and ‘dysfunctional 
system’. 17  Any future post-Brexit agricultural 
policy is aimed at simplifying the EU model.18  
Three central aspects of the CAP are heavily 
criticised by the UK Government, all to do 
with direct payments: the basic payment 
scheme (which constitutes 70% of direct 
payments); greening requirements (linked to 
30% of direct payments) and cross-compliance 
requirements.19 These requirements have been 
criticised for not ensuring environmental 
protection that is high enough, being too 
bureaucratic and procedural, not providing 
good value for money and resulting in 
excessive penalties. Further, it has been 
argued that cross-compliance requirements 
are already part of the UK legal baseline.20  
However, cross-compliance requirements 
go well beyond standards enshrined in law. 
In particular, farmers’ current obligations 
under the CAP to ensure good agricultural and 
environmental conditions (GAEC) go beyond 
the regulatory baseline in the UK and draw on 
existing good agricultural/farming practices. 
Another central aim of the UK Government is 
to provide certainty for farmers by ensuring 
stable funding until 2022 (or more accurately 
until the end of this Parliament) with no 
redistribution around the UK (the process 
of ‘Barnettisation’).21  However, the level of 
support received by farmers beyond this date is 
uncertain.
A ‘Green Brexit’
‘Enhancing our natural environment is 
a vital mission for this Government. We 
are committed to ensuring we leave the 
environment in a better condition than we 
found it. And leaving the European Union 
allows us to deliver the policies required to 
achieve that - to deliver a Green Brexit’.
Defra Secretary Michael Gove, Oxford Farming 
Conference 201822 
Brexit is seen as an opportunity to deliver a 
‘Green Brexit’. At the 2018 Oxford Farming 
Conference, Environment Secretary, Michael 
Gove, further stated that Brexit offers the 
opportunity to design:
‘…our own agriculture policy, our own 
environment policies, our own economic 
policies, shaped by our own collective 
interests’ and to ensure that we leave the 
environment in a better condition than we 
found it’.23 
The Agriculture Bill removes direct payments 
and builds upon Pillar 2 of the CAP, in 
particular agri-environment schemes. To 
deliver a ‘Green Brexit’, farmers will need to 
deliver ‘public money for public goods’ by, 
for example, creating ecosystem services, 
mitigating climate change and promoting 
animal and plant health and welfare.24  Farmers 
will be financially supported by ‘public money’ 
only if they deliver ‘public goods’. This means 
an end to payments directly supporting 
farmers’ income – a central characteristic of 
the CAP and of UK agricultural policy before 
EU membership. However, if not managed 
appropriately, an agricultural transition away 
b.  UK Government commitments on post-Brexit  
agricultural policy
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Post-Brexit agricultural 
policies in England, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. 
England          Wales   Northern Ireland   Scotland
Stage in  
policy process
‘Health and Harmony’ 
consultation 
completed (Feb.-May 
2018).
Draft UK Agriculture 
Bill. 
‘The Future for Food, 
Farming and the 
Environment’ Policy 
Paper (Sept. 2018).
‘Brexit and Our 
Land’ consultation 
completed  
(July- Oct. 2018). 
Northern Ireland 
Future Agricultural 
Policy Framework’ 
engagement 
completed (July-Oct. 
2018). 
‘Stability and 
Simplicity’ 
consultation 
completed (June-Aug. 
2018).
 
Strategy document 
from Agriculture 
Champions (May 
2018). 
Key themes Public money for 
public goods based on 
payment by results/
outcomes.
Productivity (Clause 
1.2, Agriculture Bill).
Public goods based  
on payment by 
results/outcomes. 
Economic resilience. 
An environmentally 
sustainable 
agriculture sector 
based on payment  
by results/outcomes.
Productivity. 
Economic resilience. 
Supply chains. 
Maintain 
environmental 
standards based on 
payment by results/
outcomes.
Production efficiency. 
Natural capital.
Simplification during 
the transition.
Change 
to policy 
instruments
No direct payments. 
Mentions regulatory 
baseline but also 
willingness to abolish 
cross-compliance 
and greening 
No direct payments. 
Regulatory baseline 
building upon the 
Well-being of Future 
Generations (Wales) 
Act 2015 and the 
Some direct payments  
(but more limited than 
under CAP).
Regulatory baseline  
and incentives.
Some direct payments 
(but more limited 
than under CAP).
Regulatory baseline.
Concerns and 
gaps
Focus on productivity 
and natural 
capital rather than 
sustainable food 
production.
English RDP funds 
from the CAP are 
broader in scope than 
the delivery of public 
money for public 
goods.
Focus on productivity 
and natural 
capital rather than 
sustainable food 
production.
Welsh RDP funds 
from the CAP are 
broader in scope than 
the Public Goods and 
Economic Resilience 
schemes.
Focus on productivity 
and natural 
capital rather than 
sustainable food 
production.
Northern Irish RDP 
funds from the 
CAP are broader in 
scope than the new 
suggested schemes.
Focus on productivity 
and natural 
capital rather than 
sustainable food 
production.
Scottish RDP funds 
from the CAP are 
broader in scope than 
the new suggested 
schemes
Table adapted from Hart & Maréchal36   and Petetin, Dobbs, Gravey37 
Another key similarity is the focus on 
training in all four policy proposals.
Two key concerns can be highlighted from 
Box 2. First, the willingness to remove cross-
compliance requirements, in England in 
particular, could lead to a lowering of the 
regulatory baseline. No governmental 
commitment has been expressed to ensure 
regulatory standards would actually be 
maintained. Second, if public goods/
ecosystem services are defined narrowly, 
this would prevent the creation of schemes 
that would encompass multiple aspects of 
the countryside and could reduce what is 
currently feasible under the RDPs. This could 
be highly detrimental to the future of rural 
areas and decrease rural vitality.
The UK and the devolved administrations 
are at risk of missing some of the key 
opportunities presented by being outside 
of the CAP. For example, a recent decision 
by Defra to reject a crop rotation trial under 
its new Environmental Land Management 
scheme (ELM) raises concerns as to the actual 
meaning of ‘public goods’. It appears that 
Defra considered ‘good soil management’ as a 
‘natural asset’ but not as a ‘public good’.34  This 
stands in contrast to the Health and Harmony 
consultation, which clearly highlighted 
‘improved soil health’ as a public good.35   
Doing more of the same will not suffice to 
tackle the challenges faced by agriculture. 
This contrast highlights the difference 
between ambitious policy statements and the 
practicalities of achieving a policy based on 
public money for public goods and the issues 
relating to what constitutes a public good, 
as well as the assessment and evaluation of 
such public goods for financial support (e.g. 
whether support will be based on habitats, 
species, specific achieved steps, or some  
other metric).
d. The Agriculture Bill: Easing or fuelling tensions?
The move towards ‘public money for public 
goods’ has been generally welcomed by 
stakeholders. With this new approach, 
England has set an innovative pathway for 
the design of a future agricultural policy 
and the setting up of financial limits (related 
both to the types of schemes allowed and 
at which level of funding such schemes 
would be supported). As such this pathway 
is likely to be followed by the devolved 
administrations. However, numerous 
concerns have been raised following this 
planned policy overhaul (Box 3). While 
all four nations of the UK appear set on 
‘greening’ their agricultural policies, policy 
divergence after Brexit could mean very 
different shades of green existing side by 
side (Box 2).
Overall, the four nations of the UK must 
carry forward the opportunity created 
by leaving the CAP and embrace ‘public 
money for public goods’ as a driver of 
policy change. The key element will be 
the implementation and delivery of such 
policies across the UK. Such a forward-
looking approach requires innovative 
pathways to deliver a ‘Green Brexit’ in 
agriculture building on the already existing 
diversity of farming policies in the UK. 
However, leaving the EU and the CAP 
means abandoning a shared framework 
of agricultural, environmental and trade 
policies. Some of these areas of policy are 
devolved (agriculture, environment), while 
others are not (such as trade). While more 
diversity can be desirable to a certain extent, 
common frameworks are necessary to 
avoid a race to the bottom and to foster a 
race to the top in environmental, food and 
farming standards.  
Box 2
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III.  
The international trade 
context
In addition to leaving the CAP, the UK will change its trading 
relationship with the EU. As part of the EU Customs Union, 
the UK currently faces no tariffs and no non-tariff barriers to 
trade within the EU. Goods that can be commercialised in 
the UK can also be sold across the EU. 
The UK also has easy access to labour for 
the agri-food industry from within the EU. 
While the exact nature of the future trading 
relationship between the UK and the EU has 
not yet been negotiated, it is noteworthy that 
UK agri-food products exported to the EU 
would face very high EU tariffs under World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules (what some 
commentators have called ‘falling back on 
WTO terms’).
Box 4 reproduces modelling results from the 
Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute detailing 
the expected impacts of three scenarios: a 
bespoke deal with the EU, WTO terms and 
unilateral free-trade.42 
 
Tariffs under the ‘WTO default’ scenario 
discussed above are the EU’s current WTO 
‘Most Favoured Nations’ (MFN) tariffs – i.e. the 
tariffs that the EU must apply across the board 
to all goods coming into the EU market if they 
are not covered by a Free Trade Agreement. 
This scenario assumes that the UK would 
apply the same high levels of tariffs. This 
scenario would have a differentiated impact 
across the UK farming sector. Sectors where 
the UK is a net exporter, such as sheep and 
barley, would suffer most. In contrast, sectors 
where the UK is a net importer, such as beef 
and dairy, could see increased domestic 
demand if the price of imports rises sharply 
as a result of tariffs.43  
But in response to EU tariffs, the UK could 
decide to apply lower tariffs – or even no 
tariffs. This is what the unilateral trade 
liberalisation scenario assesses. In this 
scenario, net exporters are still harmed by 
high EU tariffs, and net importer sectors such 
as beef and dairy are also negatively affected 
because they are put in direct competition 
with products from across the globe at lower 
prices (and potentially lower standards). 
In March 2019, the UK Government 
announced that it would not apply tariffs to 
95% of goods imported to the UK in the case 
of a no-deal Brexit.44 However, tariffs will 
remain for most agricultural products (apart 
from i.e. eggs, wheat and potatoes) to ensure 
a certain protection for British farmers from 
world markets. 
The multiple trade scenarios will have 
different consequences for domestic 
agriculture and differential environmental 
impacts requiring a policy response. But 
overall it is vital that any future trade policy 
supports UK agriculture.
Ongoing tensions
Governmental promises 
Taking back control
Simplification
Holistic approach
Green Brexit
In line with EU 
environmental and  
animal welfare standards
Cross-compliance 
requirements are 
guaranteed by UK legal 
baseline
Maintaining UK 
environmental and  
animal welfare standards
Public money for public 
goods
Budget
Devolution issues
Ongoing developments and concerns
•  Control for the UK Government but not necessarily 
for the devolved administrations. Example: no co-
design in Agriculture Bill.
•  The unwanted consequences of free trade deals when 
modifying UK policies and legislation.
•  The drafting of environmental land management 
contracts could result in increased bureaucracy. 
•  No links between agricultural policy and a food 
strategy in UK governmental policy/Agriculture Bill.
•  Discrepancies between statements by Defra Secretary, 
Michael Gove and International Trade Secretary Liam 
Fox: Free trade deals and problems with imports that 
lower environmental and animal welfare standards.
•  The Secretary of State, Michael Gove, is keen to 
embrace gene editing technology (which could lead 
to a difficult trading situation with the EU).
•  The relevant legal instruments (acts, regulations and 
statutory instruments) could be repealed. 
•  Defra Secretary, Michael Gove and former Farming 
Minister, George Eustice, refused to amend the 
Agriculture Bill to ban imports of food produced with 
lower production standards. They have argued that 
these amendments should be included in the Trade 
Bill.
•  No agreement on the definitions of public goods – 
creating uncertainty.
•  The assessment of the delivery of public goods 
(whether delivery will be assessed through e.g. 
the presence of habitats/species, environmental 
outcomes, or intermediate steps towards outcomes).
•  Multi-annual (EU and CAP) vs. yearly budget (post-
Brexit UK).
•  Support only guaranteed until the end of this 
Parliament (not necessarily 2022 – it could be earlier).
•  Uncertainty relating to the overall amount of financial 
support that will be available after Brexit.
•  Shift in authority to Westminster in the Agriculture 
Bill to comply with international agreements.
•  Tensions between reserved powers (especially trade 
and finance) and devolved powers.
Sources:  Engel and Petetin38  ;  Dobbs, Petetin and Gravey39  ;  EFRA Committee evidence40 ; 
Petetin41  .
Box 3
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BESPOKE FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT WITH THE EU
•  UK retains tariff and quota free access 
to the EU and EU retains tariff and 
quota free access to the UK
•  UK maintains EU tariff structure to 
rest of the world
•  5% trade facilitation costs  
on UK-EU27 trade
+3%   0%  +3%
-1%   0%  -1% +1%   +1%  0%
+29% +10% +17%
-38% -11% -30%
+44% +22% +18%
-17% -6% -12%-36% -11% -29%-50% -10% -45%
WTO DEFAULT
•  MFN tariffs applied to imports 
from the EU
•  TRQs from 3rd countries retained
•  MFN tariffs applied to UK exports 
destined for the EU
UNILATERAL 
TRADE  
LIBERALISATION
•  Zero tariffs applied  
on imports to the  
UK from both the  
EU and the rest of  
the world
Price
Production
Output value 
(output value = price x production)
IMPACT OF DIFFERENT  
TRADING SCENARIOS  
ON UK AGRI-FOOD SECTORS  
(AFBI MODELLING)
Beef Sheep Pigs
0%   0%  0% +2%   0%  +1% -1%   0%  -1% -2%   0%  -1%
-6%   -1%  -5%
+28% +11% +15% +37% +7% +30%
-12% -3% -9% -12% -2% -10% -6% -1% -5% -8% -2% -7%
-4% -1% -4%
Poultry Milk & 
Dairy
Wheat Barley
Box 4
Source: Davis, J., Feng, S., Patten, M., Binfield, J. 2017. Impacts of Alternative Post-Brexit Trade Agreements on UK Agriculture: Sector Analyses using the FAPRI-UK 
Model. https://www.afbini.gov.uk/publications/afbi-report-post-brexit-trade-agreements-uk-agriculture
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IV. 
Setting the bar: Learning 
from innovative policies 
and practices within the EU
There are a number of experiences and good practice cases 
of innovation in agricultural policy across the EU Member 
States happening under the umbrella of the EU and the 
flexibilities provided by the CAP. Some of these policies take 
advantage of the different options offered by the CAP, while 
others build on national policy competences to complement 
European policies. This section draws lessons for the future 
of British agriculture from five examples of innovative 
practices: fair trading practices in Spain; social agriculture 
in Italy; agroecology and agroforestry in France; and public 
procurement in Denmark.
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a.
Spain: Strengthening fair 
trading practices in the 
food supply chain
Spain is one of the most active EU countries 
in this area. The Spanish agricultural 
production sector is highly fragmented and 
mostly comprised of small and medium-
sized enterprises. Spain has adopted a mixed 
model of regulatory/statutory instruments 
and voluntary initiatives to rebalance the 
deficiencies within the supply chain. The 
model is based on both public enforcement 
and private control. The legal basis for this 
new model is Act 12/2013 on Measures to 
Improve the Functioning of the Food Supply 
Chain.45  
The Act regulates contractual relationships 
in the food supply chain and acknowledges 
the ‘asymmetries in bargaining power’ and 
‘a lack of transparency in price formation 
and potentially unfair and anticompetitive 
commercial practices’ that negatively affect 
competitiveness in the food sector.46  The 
2013 Act also sets the foundations for a self-
regulating private system, which resulted 
in the creation of the 2016 Code of Good 
Business Practices in Food Contracting.47  
This system is quite comprehensive, 
combining synergic statutory and voluntary 
instruments. It adopts a holistic approach to 
solving unfair trading practices by fostering 
fair, balanced and loyal relations between 
the operators within the food supply chain 
(Box 5.). A tenet of this mixed approach is the 
focus on the first and last actors of the supply 
chain, the agricultural producers and the 
consumers.
Existing information indicates a progressive 
improvement of Spanish commercial 
relationships in the food supply chain since 
the creation of the mixed model. To date 
more than 100 operators have adhered 
to the 2016 Code. However, a number of 
supermarkets still have not adhered to it (e.g. 
Carrefour, Lidl and Aldi).
Between January 2014 and the end of 
2016, the Agency for Food Information and 
Control (see Box 5.) carried out almost 4,000 
controls and inspections. The most common 
infringements are breaches of payment 
deadlines (44% of the overall number of fines), 
followed by the absence of written contracts.
 
A key obstacle remains the unequal 
negotiation footing of the parties to a food 
Compulsory baseline rules for all 
operators included in the 2013 Act: 
1.  The establishment of a food contract or 
the contractualisation of commercial 
relationships in the food supply chain. The 
Act enshrines the mandatory use of written 
contracts to regulate sales, provide legal 
certainty and guarantee operator’s rights. 
There are two main provisos: 
 •  The value of the contract must exceed 
€2,500.
     •  There must be an imbalance between the 
contracting parties.
2.  Unfair trading practices: the Act defines 
and establishes a list of specific unfair 
trading practices. To stop them, the Act 
prohibits the following practices:  
•  Unilateral modification of the contractual 
terms (unless by mutual agreement of  
the parties).
    •  Additional payments over the  
agreed price.
    •  The demand for commercially sensitive 
information from the supplier beyond the 
relevant product. 
    •  The improper use by an operator of 
another's business initiative for its own 
profit and initiatives constituting unfair 
advertising.
3.  The creation of an infringement and 
penalty system to achieve balanced and 
loyal relationships between operators of 
the food supply chain. The Act creates a 
penalty procedure that includes three types 
of sanctions that can be imposed: minor, 
serious and very serious infringements. 
4.  An autonomous public enforcement 
body, the Agency for Food Information 
and Control (AICA), implements the new 
approach, checks compliance with legal 
provisions and ensures fair commercial 
relations between farmers, food industries 
and distribution companies in the agri-
food sector. 
Self-regulation or voluntary measures 
included in the 2016 Code:
 
5.  The Code creates a voluntary control 
system that offers the opportunity to go 
beyond legal requirements for operators 
who wish to adhere to it. 
6.  Clauses on specific commercial practices 
for primary producers: operators in the 
food supply chain undertake to respect 
the following aspects in their commercial 
relationships with primary producers:  
•  To encourage the adoption of measures 
that help to achieve the sustainability of 
the primary sector and to remunerate 
proportionally the value provided to the 
supply chain by agricultural production.
    •  To pay special attention to compliance 
with the applicable regulations on 
food-related information furnished to 
consumers about the origin of products 
(in particular fresh fruits and vegetables). 
7.  The Code establishes a dispute resolution 
system. When a dispute arises, the 
operators agree to resolve the conflict or 
discrepancy within 10 days or 20 days 
for companies larger than SMEs from the 
presentation of the request. If no resolution 
occurs, the dispute will be submitted to a 
mediation or arbitration system.
Monitoring and surveillance body: 
8.  The model is monitored by the Food 
Supply Chain Observatory, which has a 
double role: 
•  To guarantee the reviewing and 
strengthening of the law by identifying 
improvement pathways. 
    •  To provide a better knowledge of markets 
and analysis of the basic structure of cost 
and prices and the factors responsible for 
their evolution.
Eight components of 
the Spanish fair trading 
practices pricing model
The establishment of balanced, just contractual relations 
is central to a fair and transparent food supply chain. UK 
Governments can learn from the Spanish case that better 
agri-food supply chain regulation that recognises power 
imbalances in the food chain offers primary producers’ 
higher levels of protection.
Box 5
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Lessons for the UK
Underpinned by the values of solidarity and 
inclusion, social agriculture is a practice of 
local development that aims to be socially, 
economically and ecologically sustainable. 
It generates two types of production: 
services such as those related to health, the 
environment and education; and products 
such as food, fibre and energy.
Social farms are often linked to sustainable 
farming practices, including organic farming, 
local food systems and short food supply 
chains. They are able to create niche markets 
with their produce that has an important 
social value and link agriculture to the service 
economy with a focus on care, education, 
therapeutic uses of farming and training 
(see Box 6). Farms and relevant agricultural 
techniques and practices – e.g. horticulture, 
livestock husbandry or woodland 
management – can promote human mental 
and physical health, as well as quality of life. 
In addition, they offer the opportunity for 
women to create their own employment, 
strengthening rural women’s economic 
empowerment.
Italy has 400 social agricultural cooperatives 
(out of 14,000 cooperatives in total) involved 
in the entire agricultural supply chain. They 
have 4,000 employees across Italy (out of 
320,000 total) and a production value of €200 
million.52   Italy has strong regional, social 
farming networks. The Italian regions, in 
particular Tuscany, have been very proactive 
in embracing this type of agriculture. 
In 2011, Italy initiated a National Forum 
on Social Agriculture to promote social 
farming as an innovation to the agricultural 
system.53 To reinforce the role of social 
farming, in 2015 Italy passed a law to promote 
social agriculture’s contribution to local 
communities and rural areas.54 The Act 
also established an Observatory on Social 
Agriculture.55  
Social farming is also an instrument of re-
appropriation by the individual of their social 
role from two perspectives: 
•  A professional perspective: to facilitate 
reintegration in the labour market through 
the acquisition of agricultural techniques 
and practices;
Fair dealing practices play a key role in the 
2018 Agriculture Bill. The relevant clauses 
build upon the existing Groceries Code 
Adjudicator49  (GCA), which was established 
by the 2009 Groceries Supply Code of 
Practice.50  However, neither the Agriculture 
Bill nor the Code of Practice acknowledge 
the weak position of farmers in contract 
negotiations. Furthermore, the Bill oddly 
restricts fair-dealing requirements to the first 
purchaser of agricultural products. This is 
an important first step. Nonetheless, to deal 
with the issue of unfair trading practices, 
the entire food supply chain should have the 
same requirements. 
Three lessons can be drawn from the 
Spanish example. First, better regulation of 
the agri-food supply chain would improve 
the position of primary producers (with 
a strong focus on local, seasonal and 
sustainable products). This could be achieved 
by acknowledging the weak position 
of producers and encouraging them to 
form producer organisations. Second, the 
development of best practices in commercial 
and contractual relations between operators 
in the chain should be encouraged – leading 
to higher levels of protection. Third, a rapid 
and efficient dispute resolution system could 
be established as well as a monitoring and 
surveillance body that identifies potential 
problems and assesses the quality of 
commercial relations. This could be achieved 
by widening the remit and powers of the GCA 
– as put forward by Sustain.51 
contract. The economic and organisational 
strength of one of the contracting parties 
(industry, distribution) against the fragility 
of the other (farmers) when negotiating 
the contractual conditions is a continuing 
problem.
Agricultural producers (who act as the first 
link in the chain) should take advantage of 
the incentives and opportunities to group 
around organisations and associations to 
increase their power. Cooperatives and 
producer organisations of agricultural 
producers introduce economies of scale, 
more efficiency and competitiveness.48   Only 
with these organisations will it be possible 
to reinforce the negotiating position of 
agricultural producers in the market, creating 
better prices and fairer conditions in  
agri-food contracts. 
b.  
 Italy: Promoting social 
agriculture
Social agriculture occupies an increasingly important place 
in the Italian agricultural sector. Lessons from Italy for the 
UK Governments indicate that support for social agriculture 
can stimulate economic diversification in rural areas,  
while linking communities and enhancing mental and 
physical health. 
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The structure of social 
agriculture in Italy Lessons for the UK
•  Personal development and empowerment: 
personal capabilities are valued and 
enhanced to increase self-confidence and 
independence.
The main economic and social challenges 
faced by social agriculture are threefold: farm 
profitability; the economic comparisons 
between conventional and non-conventional 
farming components; and the viability of 
rural communities.56 
Agriculture is a sector uniquely placed to 
provide social inclusion and improve the 
durability of rural communities :
•  With farming comes responsibility (rearing 
animals; taking care of living organisms);
•  Similarity of the agricultural products 
created (these products do not indicate the 
characteristics of the people involved) - 
creating commercial opportunities.
•  Involvement of relevant communities 
and professionals to improve working 
conditions and creativity on the farm. 
In the UK, social agriculture has the capacity 
to increase the multifunctionality of 
agriculture, as well as on-farm economic 
diversification, whilst stimulating rural 
areas and increasing rural vitality. Such a 
type of agriculture could be promoted by 
reinforcing the focus on rural areas and their 
multifunctionality within the drafting of 
future agricultural policies.  
In 2018, Care Farming UK – the main UK 
civil society organisation dealing with social 
farming – was dissolved and merged with 
the Federation of City Farms and Community 
Gardens to create a new organisation called 
Social Farms & Gardens.57  They work with 
community farms and gardens, school 
farms, wildlife and roof gardens, community 
orchards, community-run allotments and 
community-supported agriculture schemes.
Three ways forward could promote social 
agriculture in the UK. 1) supporting measures 
to encourage favourable conditions for 
social agriculture. 2) improving knowledge 
exchange between the actors involved in 
social agriculture would encourage best 
practices and mutual support. 3) improving 
the economic and financial sustainability of 
social agriculture. 
Types
(both not-for 
profit)
Models Activities Aims Funding
Social co-operatives
Social co-operatives 
and ‘social-private’ 
organisations
Green care, i.e. 
care-based social 
agriculture
Inclusion, i.e.  
employment-
oriented; acquiring 
skills and job 
prospects
•  On-farm child and 
elderly care
•  Educational 
services (food and 
environmental)
•  Therapies
•  Rehabilitation
•  Professional 
training
•  Employment
•  Provision of 
health, social and 
educational services 
•  Promoting human 
mental, emotional, 
social and physical 
wellbeing
•  Integration
•  Engagement of 
disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups 
in production 
activities (e.g. 
people with 
mental or physical 
disabilities, 
offenders, homeless 
and marginalised 
people) 
•  Increase 
employability
Payment or monetary 
compensation for 
the services paid by 
public bodies
Partial support 
from public 
bodies (directly or 
indirectly), including 
rural development 
funds
Box 6
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Agroecology has become extremely popular 
in international debates on agriculture. It 
has been embraced by a variety of actors, 
from alternative farming movements such 
as La Via Campesina to the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). With such 
a variety of supporters it is not surprising 
that many definitions of agroecology exist. 
Some definitions focus on techniques: 
how ‘agroecological techniques, based on 
mimicking natural cycles, reduce the need 
for external inputs and help create growing 
ecosystems that foster more regenerative 
ways of producing food with nature’.58  Others 
adopt a more holistic reading of agroecology 
as ‘a way of redesigning food systems, 
from the farm to the table, with a goal of 
achieving ecological, economic, and social 
sustainability [that] links together science, 
practice, and movements focused on social 
change’.59   
In recent years, France has adopted ambitious 
environmental objectives and principles. 
The 2014 Agriculture, Food & Forest Act, 
which aims to help French farming pursue 
an agroecological transition, is one example 
of this trend. The Act formalises some 
of the commitments and objectives of 
the agroecology project called ‘Produce 
Differently’ pushed by the Ministry for 
Agriculture since 2012. This project rests on 
12 pillars, with reforming farmers education 
coming first (see Box 7). 
Between 2015 and 2018 the French 
agricultural education system (which 
brings together up to 450,000 students) was 
profoundly reformed to put agroecology 
at its core, by building on a simple idea: if 
farmers need to produce differently, the 
education system needs to be able to teach 
them how to do so. This required further 
education for teachers, changes to degree 
content and the creation of regional networks 
of farming colleges and farms interested in 
participating in pilot projects to demonstrate 
new approaches. Farmers can, in addition to 
engaging with the different life-long training 
opportunities, set up their own groups to 
share good practices for sustainability, known 
as economic and environmental interest 
groupings (EEIGs).
12 Pillars of the French 
agroecology project
The French agroecology project shows, firstly 
that a profound shift in agricultural practices 
takes time beyond one parliament, requiring 
cross-party support to provide certainty for 
all involved. Second, training is critical to 
teach new practices and demonstrate their 
successes, both through formal courses 
and peer-to-peer learning. No rethinking 
of agricultural practices is possible without 
a new approach to how farmers are trained 
(or not trained – currently in Northern 
Ireland ‘62% of working owners and 40% of 
employees [hold] no formally recognised 
qualifications’66 ). The 2014 Agriculture, Food 
& Forest Act echoes on-going discussions 
in the UK with all four policies mentioning 
training and knowledge exchange as key to 
deliver future farming. Third, farmers are 
more likely to apply these new practices 
if they are supported by other actors in 
the supply chain – no systemic change is 
possible if only public actors are involved. 
c.  
France: Sharing 
knowledge for an 
agroecological transition
The French agricultural education system has been 
reformed based on a simple idea: if farmers are to produce 
differently, the education system needs to teach them how 
to do so. Reforms in France offer hope that many challenges 
facing UK farming can be overcome through changes to the 
design and delivery of the agricultural curriculum.
1. Reform agricultural training
2.  Share good practices by setting up 
EEIGs
3.  Reduce the use of phytosanitary 
products 
4. Provide advice 
5.  Overhaul public support 
programmes to support an 
agroecological transition 
6.  Increase support for organic 
agriculture 
7.  Strengthen local supply chains
8. Reduce use of antibiotics
9.  Implement changes in seed 
evaluation
10.  Increase carbon sequestration 
11. Foster beekeeping
12. Support agroforestry
On-going evaluation of agroecology teaching 
shows mixed, albeit encouraging results. 
According to the French Agriculture Ministry, 
agroecology requires a ‘holistic consideration 
of each farm in order to take account of 
every aspect of its operation and the balances 
within its agro-ecosystem’.60 Some teachers 
adopt this holistic approach to challenge 
‘common sense’ such as inviting farmers 
to re-think what is a clean, tidy field, or a 
clean, tidy hedge – to learn to work ‘with’ 
not ‘against’ nature.61   They also change 
pedagogy to place a greater emphasis on 
preparing students to deal with uncertainties 
and controversies in their professional life. 
But agroecologist supporters have also faced 
backlash and resistance on the ground, with 
the transition rejected by some farmers as a 
‘new religion’ with its ‘missionaries’.62  
But this is also changing. First, while some 
farmers remain reluctant to change their 
practices, others are leading the way by 
setting up EEIGs. Since 2015, close to 500 
EEIGs have been created, bringing together 
over 9,000 farmers interested in transitioning 
to agroecology and complementing changes 
to formal training with peer-to-peer support 
and shared innovation.63  Second, key actors 
in the French agricultural system are slowly 
coming on board and developing their 
own agroecology programmes – from the 
‘Chambres d’Agriculture (local farming bodies 
with elected representatives from different 
farming trade unions), to major agri-food 
actors such as the fast food chain McDonald’s 
(which works with 39,000 farmers in France) 
or one of the largest cooperatives in France, 
Terrena (22,000 farmers).64   Awareness of 
agroecology among farmers is increasing 
across the board: 50% of farmers had heard 
of the concept in 2014, a proportion which 
increased to 83% by 2016.65  
Lessons for the UK
Box 7
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Agroforestry covers a wide range of ‘land-
use systems and technologies where woody 
perennials (trees, shrubs, palms, bamboos, 
etc.) are deliberately used on the same land-
management units as agricultural crops 
and/or animals, in some form of spatial 
arrangement or temporal sequence’.67 The 
benefits of agroforestry include increases 
in soil organic carbon and reductions 
in erosion,68   better water management, 
increased wildlife habitats and better animal 
welfare (by providing shade and shelter for 
livestock).69  
Recent studies estimate agroforestry 
covers between 15 and 20 million hectares 
in Europe. The most prevalent form 
of agroforestry is silvopasture (85% of 
agroforested areas), such as ‘forest or 
woodland grazing and pastoral land with 
hedgerows, isolated/scattered trees or trees 
in lines or belts’, combining trees and shrubs 
with forage animal production.70  Conversely, 
silvoarable systems (mixing trees, shrubs or 
fruit trees with arable crops) represent only 
2% of agroforested areas. Today, both forms 
of agroforestry cover only a tiny share of the 
land they could potentially cover in Europe 
– leaving huge room for improvement. Yet 
while agroforestry is becoming more popular, 
traditional agroforested areas in Europe faced 
a sharp decline during the 20th century.71  
This raises a dual challenge for policy-
makers: first, how to reverse the decline in 
traditional agroforestry practices; and second, 
how to foster the development of new forms 
of agroforestry. At the heart of this challenge 
is tackling the existing regulatory barriers to 
agroforestry uptake – primarily present in  
the CAP.
The CAP is often portrayed as preventing 
agroforestry uptake. The French example 
shows how that same policy can be used to 
support certain forms of agroforestry and how 
domestic policies adopted alongside the CAP 
can increase this support.
Regulatory barriers to agroforestry under the 
CAP fall into two categories. The first category 
of barriers is related to rules surrounding 
eligibility for direct payments related to the 
number of trees that can exist on a hectare 
of land. The rules changed during the 2013 
CAP reform – from 50 to 100 trees per 
hectare (excluding fruit trees where there 
are no limits). After this reform, the French 
Government and farming representatives 
provided information to farmers that stressed 
these levels and offered dedicated support in 
putting together an agroforestry plan. The 
second hurdle is whether agroforestry is 
supported by agri-environmental measures 
and what type of support is offered.72  
Access to agri-environment funding for 
agroforestry turns the spotlight away from 
Brussels and squarely on the Member States. 
France was one of the rare countries in the 
EU to choose to support new agroforestry 
development in both the 2007-2013 and 2014-
2020 CAPs. The 2007-2013 funding supported 
80% of installation costs, while 2014-2020 
funding (which did not cover all of France) 
also covered maintenance costs. 
However, not all barriers to the adoption 
of agroforestry are regulatory – and not 
all regulatory barriers are of EU origin.  
Supporting agroforestry is the 12th pillar of 
the French plan for agroecology. As such, 
measures aimed at changing the farming 
d. 
France: Removing barriers 
to agroforestry uptake
Integrating trees with farming systems has frequently faced 
economic, regulatory and cultural barriers. UK Governments 
can learn from this approach to provide security of funds, 
deliver joined up advisory services and find the cultural 
cross-overs to make agroforestry visible and relatable  
to citizens.
curriculum and fostering peer-to-peer 
learning (discussed in the previous section), 
also cover agroforestry. In addition, a specific 
agroforestry plan (2015-2020) saw the French 
Government implementing the following 
activities in recent years:
•  Commissioning research to improve 
knowledge of the different forms of 
agroforestry currently practiced in France 
and their impact on the environment and 
food production; 
•  Fostering synergies between existing French 
and European quality and origin labels and 
agroforestry practices, making more visible 
the agroforestry nature of specific products 
such as rare-breed pig production in the 
French Basque Country73 ; 
•  Running agroforestry competitions at a 
regional and national scale, both for farmers 
intending to start a new agroforestry 
project74 (Arbres d’Avenir) and for farmers 
in two categories, with projects that have 
been running for at least 5 or 10 years, 
respectively.75   These competitions are 
funded, in part, by large French companies 
and foundations, and make examples of 
good agroforestry practice easily available.
The French agroforestry plan further 
identified French tenancy agreements as 
a major regulatory hurdle to agroforestry 
development (70% of farmland in France is 
under tenancy arrangements). The French 
Rural Code states that the tenant cannot plant 
trees or hedgerows without the consent of the 
landowner, and conversely, the landowner 
cannot plant trees without the consent of 
the tenant. Trees are inherently considered 
immovable property and therefore belong 
to the owner. The farmer can only plant 
trees if there is a clause to this effect in their 
tenancy agreement. Specific clauses have 
been introduced in tenancy agreements 
relating to orchards and these set the values 
of the planted trees to protect farmers in these 
circumstances. Generally, however, the farmer 
planting trees is in a situation of insecurity, 
unable to benefit from the added value of the 
land when the tenancy agreement comes 
to an end. In response, in 2018 the Ministry 
for Agriculture published a guide for tenants 
and landowners providing advice on how 
to write or amend tenancy agreements to 
accommodate a new agroforestry project and 
provide greater security for tenants.76  
While the UK had the same opportunities 
as France to support agroforestry within 
the CAP, support has been patchier. Under 
the 2007-2013 CAP in the UK, Northern 
Ireland was the only country budgeting for 
the measure supporting new agroforestry 
development,77  yet it failed to implement 
it. The situation is slightly better under the 
2014-2020 CAP, as all but England have 
chosen to implement a measure to support 
the establishment and maintenance of 
agroforestry systems. Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales have each set different 
rules for tree density, land eligibility and the 
type of shrubs or trees supported.78  
Critically, no agrarian land is eligible for 
the new agroforestry support in Wales, only 
municipal or private land, while in Scotland 
a minimum density of 200 trees per hectare 
is required. This means that farms cannot 
receive both agroforestry support and general 
CAP income support – and that farms with 
a tree density between 100 and 200 trees per 
hectare are eligible for neither. This pre-
existing divergence within the UK stresses 
that, especially in the case of England, the 
CAP is not a barrier to agroforestry uptake – 
lack of domestic government support is. 
The French example shows how government 
schemes can be designed to ensure farmers 
do not need to choose between general 
support and specific agroforestry funding. At 
the very least, future agricultural policy in the 
UK should not disadvantage farms pursuing 
agroforestry. Agroforestry pilot schemes 
should be encouraged to help other farmers 
learn about the practice. Finally, agroforestry 
is not a short-term investment for farmers 
– which raises questions about how to 
make agroforestry work for tenant farmers 
and landowners, and whether tenancy 
agreements in the UK need to be adapted for 
delivering long-term projects. 
Lessons for the UK
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A key criticism of the Agriculture Bill as 
it stands is that it ‘has no vision for food’ 
because it focuses on agricultural production 
and its environmental impact but provides 
no broader strategy to improve the quality of 
food and access to food in the UK.79  But other 
European countries have managed to develop 
their own food policy within the confines of 
the CAP. Denmark in particular is recognised 
for its approach to organic food procurement 
that both supports Danish organic food 
production and increases the quality of food 
available in the country.
The Danish approach to organic food 
procurement is an interesting example 
of bottom-up, local-government led 
initiatives being supported and expanded at 
national level. It also illustrates how public 
procurement policies can be used to support 
sustainable agricultural production. Finally, it 
exemplifies the key role that cities can play.
While many municipalities in Denmark have 
engaged with organic public procurement, 
Copenhagen has been especially ambitious.
In 2007, the Danish capital adopted a 
strategy to turn Copenhagen into an ‘eco-
metropolis’, which included commitments 
for ‘at least 20% organic food in the city’s food 
consumption, with the city taking the lead 
with at least 90% organic food in municipal 
institutions’.80   It has since met its 90% target. 
This target was reached without increasing 
food procurement costs by focusing 
on conversion (change in food habits, 
increased share of vegetarian food) instead 
of substitution (replacing like for like non-
organic/organic produce). 
Building on the success of municipal 
policies, the Danish Organic Action Plan 
2020 (released in 2012) aimed to double the 
organic agricultural area in Denmark by 2020 
(already at 57% in 2018) with a core focus on 
public procurement, using the 500,000 daily 
meals in the public sector to boost demand 
for organic products.81   The Action Plan 
received a UN silver Future Policy Award for 
Agroecology in 2018.
e. 
Denmark: Embracing 
organic food procurement
Other nations have developed their own food policies within 
the confines of the CAP. In Denmark setting targets for the 
use of organic food in public procurement has stimulated 
the domestic organic agriculture market. UK Governments 
should take confidence from this approach and work to 
connect sustainable production with healthy consumption 
through public procurement channels.
As part of its push for targeted pro-organic 
public procurement, Denmark created a label 
for public kitchens serving organic food 
– bronze (between 30-60% organic food), 
silver (over 60%) or gold label (over 90%). The 
objective is for all public kitchens to achieve 
at least silver by 2020. To that end, the Plan 
offers funding for conversion projects. 
Conversion requires training kitchen staff in 
budgeting, menu planning, practical cooking 
classes and learning from conversion 
pioneers.82  Between 2012 and 2014, the 
percentage of organic food in Danish 
public kitchens rose by 24%. Organic public 
procurement policies were key to driving the 
market for organic food in Denmark, with 
40% of all organic food sales going to public 
bodies in 2013 and 2014, and organic sales 
more than doubling since 2011.
In contrast to the Danish Government, the 
UK Government has set no targets for the use 
of organic food in public procurement. The 
initiatives that exist are instead organised by 
charities. For example, Food for Life Served 
Here (run by the Soil Association) provides an 
accreditation scheme for schools, hospitals 
and care homes interested in improving the 
quality of their food by making it healthier 
and more sustainable. The scheme gives 
awards ranked from bronze to gold to 
recognise best practices. 1.8 million meals are 
certified under the scheme each day. 
However, the Danish and UK awards are 
far from equivalent. The Food for Life 
awards favour a broad commitment, 
covering nutrition, provenance, welfare 
and sustainability in various dimensions, 
versus the more targeted Danish approach, 
which is focussed solely on organic products. 
Hence, a Gold award for UK schools requires 
a minimum of 15% organic food – only half 
the minimum level of 30% to be awarded a 
bronze award for Danish schools. But the 
Food for Life programme has a broader aim: 
it is not solely focused on increasing organic 
food production. Instead, it includes the 
development of cooking activities, school 
gardens, farm visits and discussions about 
food choices.83   Beyond the differences 
in focus, it is worth keeping in mind that 
Food for Life is a charitable initiative which 
schools, hospitals etc. can pay to join and 
participate in, and which public health teams 
in local authorities may commission. It is not 
a national strategy for which public funding 
is available. 
A government set of criteria does exist in the 
UK: Defra’s balanced scorecard for public 
procurement.84  The scorecard provides 
straightforward criteria, such as cost, to be 
‘balanced’ against more complex criteria, 
such as health and wellbeing, resource 
efficiency and quality of service when 
making procurement decisions. It has been 
mandatory across central government since 
2017. 
Learning from the Danish example and 
the different levels of Food for Life Served 
Here, future government food procurement 
policy could be 1) expanded to all public 
organisations, not only central government; 
2) have clear awards with different degrees of 
ambition; and 3) be accompanied by funding 
for training for catering staff to facilitate the 
transition. 
Lessons for the UK
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The examples of innovative practices in 
Section IV highlight ways of moving beyond 
the current agricultural policy status quo and 
tackle key problems in our existing agri-
food systems. Irrespective of the outcome 
of the Brexit process, the Agriculture Bill 
in Westminster and parallel developments 
in the devolved administrations offer the 
opportunity to rethink public support and 
policies on agriculture. As part of these 
processes, collaboration between the different 
levels of governance across the UK is vital.
Developing new policies for agriculture 
in the context of a ‘Green Brexit’ needs 
to acknowledge the major contributions 
the farming and food sectors can make to 
address the major environmental threats we 
face. A recent report from leading scientists 
for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) stressed the short timeline – 
12 years – to limit climate change to 1.5°C.85   
The  Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES) came to a similar conclusion 
of the need for urgent action in the face 
of mass species extinction.86   And in May 
2019, the UK Committee on Climate Change 
recommended net-zero greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050.87   New policies need to 
rise to this urgency. 
In order to build such a long-term 
perspective, we can learn from the many 
different foresight exercises conducted 
to map sustainable agricultural futures.  
In February 2019, the leading European 
environment think tank, the Institute for 
European Environmental Policy, published a 
review of foresight exercises which looked at 
how European agriculture could reach net-
zero emissions (carbon neutrality) by 2050.88  
The review highlighted that for European 
agriculture to become net-zero and sharply 
decrease its emissions, ‘three levers of 
actions’ were needed to: 1) change production 
to less carbon-intensive products; 2) make 
production more carbon efficient; and 3) 
increase carbon sequestration potential on 
agricultural land. 
In early 2019, the NFU advocated a three-
pronged approach for British agriculture to 
become carbon neutral by 2040 with some 
notable overlaps (on carbon sequestration 
and carbon efficiency) and differences 
(change production to increase biofuel 
production, not less carbon-intensive 
products).89  
In terms of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, none of the studies in the IEEP 
review show a clear and distinct path towards 
net-zero farming – but they do show a wide 
range of emission reduction from -16% to 
-60%. They also differ sharply in how they 
deliver other environmental objectives as well 
as the trade-offs they accept. In contrast, the 
Ten Years for Agroecology (TYFA) foresight 
exercise, produced by a team led by IDDRI, a 
Paris-based sustainable development think 
tank, stands out for its focus on co-benefits 
for human health and biodiversity, which 
is critical in light of the new IPBES report.90 
This foresight exercise aimed to demonstrate 
how agroecology could be mainstreamed 
in the next CAP reform. It is particularly 
useful when considering how to introduce 
agroecology in the Agriculture Bill and future 
UK agricultural policies. 
Around the world, the translation of 
agroecology into public policy has, to date, 
been characterised by a selective pick-
and-choose approach and a tendency to 
dilute key concepts.91   This tendency has 
been compounded by three challenges: 
the difficulties of making policy for the 
medium to long term; the sheer scale of 
changes to farming practices required to 
transition to agroecology; and the need to 
question our food habits and thus engage all 
citizens in the transition. These difficulties 
are apparent in the present French plan for 
agroecology – where an objective to halve 
pesticides use by 2018 failed (pesticides use 
increased instead).92  The TYFA foresight 
exercise offers an alternative to the weak, 
‘greenwashed’ versions of agroecology. It 
offers a much more radical application of the 
conceptual understanding of agroecology 
‘as an approach that makes maximum use 
of ecological processes in order to redesign 
production systems and to radically reduce 
agricultural pressure on the environment’.93   
The TYFA model, takes into account the 
entire food chain in Europe (as well as 
European imports and exports) and builds 
hypotheses ‘with a view to achieving 
sustainable food’. Their central starting point 
is the lack of sustainability of western diets. 
In 2010, the average European diet was too 
low in fibre, fruits, vegetables and much 
too high in protein, on average consuming 
200% of the daily recommended nutritional 
benchmark. This overconsumption of 
protein, mostly animal protein, is recent, 
with a 42% increase in animal protein 
consumption between the 1960s and 1990s. 
It has had major impacts on health, the 
environment and the farming sector. The 
TYFA foresight exercise thus argues that ‘the 
increase in livestock production that has 
accompanied these changes in consumption 
is primarily based on the intensification of 
livestock farming, which is itself dependent 
on plant protein imports from the American 
continent (…) as things stand, it is the world 
that feeds Europe rather than the other way 
around, as is often claimed’.94   This argument 
is critical in the context of CAP reform – 
where intensification is often linked to the 
need for Europe to help ‘feed the world’. In 
the report, changing diets is key to offset the 
drop in production caused by the complete 
phasing out of pesticides and synthetic 
fertilisers that they model. 
In that respect, TYFA is an example of what a 
‘healthy food first’ rethink of our agricultural 
systems could look like. This approach further 
highlights the key missing component in the 
Agriculture Bill: the need to produce healthy 
and nutritious food. This is particularly 
problematic at a time when around two-
thirds of adults across the UK are overweight 
or obese, with huge costs borne by the 
National Health Service. 95 
V.
Pathways to deliver a Green 
Brexit in food and farming
Presented as a ‘once-in-a-lifetime opportunity’, new UK 
policies need to be ambitious. They need to go beyond 
addressing issues with the CAP and set out policies for 
tomorrow and a direction for the medium and long term. 
Agricultural, trade and food policies should be mutually 
supportive and call for long-term, strategic and radical 
thinking and vision. They need to do more than simply 
address today’s focus on delivering Brexit. They must set 
forward an ambitious agenda for the future that benefits the 
public, farmers and rural areas. 
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1.  Re-thinking agriculture is not just 
about agricultural policy.  
It requires changes to training, land-use 
rights, education, the entire supply chain 
(acknowledging that primary producers are 
often the weakest link in that chain), trade 
arrangements and consumption patterns. 
2.  Long-term targets are needed.  
These targets should be based on cross-
party and cross-sector consensus on a 
shared farming future – together with 
short- and medium-term evaluation to 
make it possible to hold decision-makers 
to account. Such long-term targets would 
create much-needed clarity and stability for 
all parts of the food supply chain to guide 
their investments.
3.  Change takes time and requires 
collaboration.  
Cooperation and collaboration between 
farmers, and between farmers and other 
stakeholders is key to deliver a sustainable 
farming future.  
 
Collaboration is also needed to help farmers 
and the broader food system withstand 
shocks (both financial and climatic) and 
build resilience.
4.  A shared policy framework can 
accommodate and benefit from local 
divergence and innovation.  
Our examples of innovative policies and 
practices happened in countries working 
within and alongside the constraints of the 
CAP.  
5.  Holistic, complementary and forward-
looking approaches to food and  
farming are crucial to deliver a sustainable 
farming future where food and farming  
are co-designed.
Taken together, these foresight exercises and good  
practice cases of innovation in farming lead us to 
draw five key take-home messages: 
soilassociation.org36 37REEN BREXIT
Bibliography 
1 Vote Leave (2016). Farmers will be better off if we vote to leave the EU.
2  Leadsom, A. (2016). Oral evidence to Environment Audit Committee: The Future of the Natural Environment 
after the EU Referendum inquiry. Answer to Question 343.
3 Defra (2018). Health and harmony: The future for food, farming and the environment in a Green Brexit, p. 5.
4 UK Government (2018). A green future: Our 25 Year Plan to improve the environment, p. 9.
5  Donald, P. F., Sanderson, F. J., Burfield, I. J., & van Bommel, F. P. J. (2006). Further evidence of continent-wide 
impacts of agricultural intensification on European farmland birds, 1990–2000. Agriculture, Ecosystems & 
Environment, 116(3–4), 189–196; Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (2016). State of Nature 2016. For 
further references, see: Gravey, V. (2016). Agricultural policy. In: Burns, C., Jordan, A., & Gravey, V. (Eds.) The EU 
Referendum and the UK Environment: An Expert Review (pp. 36–45). 
6  Petetin, L. (2015). The EU Common Agricultural Policy: Towards a more sustainable agriculture? In: Ako, R. and 
D. Olawuyi (Eds.), Food and agricultural Law: Readings on sustainable agriculture and the law in Nigeria (pp. 
201–224). Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria: Afe Babalola University Press.
7  For example, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have banned the cultivation of genetically modified crops 
but England has not. See: Engel, A., & Petetin, L. (2018). International obligations and devolved powers – 
ploughing through competences and GM crops. Environmental Law Review 20(1), 16-31.
8  Gravey, V. (2016). Agricultural policy. In: Burns, C., Jordan, A., & Gravey, V. (Eds.) The EU Referendum and the 
UK Environment: An Expert Review (pp. 36–45).
9  Hart, K., & Bas-Defossez, F. (2018). CAP 2021-27 : Proposals for increasing its environmental and climate 
ambition. Brussels: Institute for European Environmental Policy (p. 62).
10 Vote Leave (2016). Briefing: The CAP and CFP are wasteful and bureaucratic.
11  Farmers for Britain (2016). Brexit is a once-in-a-lifetime chance for significant and much-needed change in 
the agricultural industry.
12 Vote Leave (2016). The CAP & CFP: the high price of EU membership for Britain’s farmers and fishermen, p. 2.
13 Vote Leave (2016). The CAP & CFP, pp. 7-8.
14 Vote Leave (2016). The single market is failing British businesses.
15 Gove, M. (2019). Debate on the EU (Withdrawal) Act, Column 576. 
16 Defra (2017). Environment Secretary sets out ambition for food and farming industry.
17  Gove, M., & Eustice, G. (2018). Oral Evidence to Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee: Scrutiny of the 
Agriculture Bill, HC 1591. Answers to Questions 333, 353 & 362.
18 Gove, M. (2018). Farming for the next generation. 2018 Oxford Farming Conference.
19 Gove, M. (2018). Farming for the next generation. 2018 Oxford Farming Conference.
20 Eustice, G. (2018). Oral evidence to Environmental Audit Committee: Nitrates inquiry. Answer to Question 225.
21 Gove, M. (2018). Agriculture Bill, 2nd Reading Debate, 10 October 2018. 
22 Gove, M. (2018). Farming for the next generation. 2018 Oxford Farming Conference.
23  Gove, M. Oxford Farming Conference 2019 address by the Environment Secretary. 2019 Oxford Farming 
Conference. See also: Defra (2018). A green future: Our 25 Year Plan to improve the environment.
24 UK Government (2018). Agriculture Bill 2017-19, Clause 1.
25  See comments made by Ludivine Petetin at the Game and Wildlife Conservation Trust All-Party Parliamentary 
Group in March 2018, https://www.gwct.org.uk/policy/appg/march-2018/.
26  Eustice, G. (2018). Oral Evidence to Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee: Scrutiny of the Agriculture 
Bill, HC 1591. Answer to Question 328.
27 Gove, M. (2018). Farming for the next generation. 2018 Oxford Farming Conference.
28 See Gove, M. (2018). Agriculture Bill, 2nd Reading Debate. 10 October 2018.
29 UK-EU Draft Withdrawal Agreement, Annex 4, Article 2.
30  Memorandum of Understanding and supplementary agreements between the UK Government, Scottish 
Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee 
(2001, Sewel Convention).
31  Petetin, L., & Dobbs, M. (2018). Written evidence submitted to National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, 
Environment and Rural Affairs Committee: UK Agriculture Bill inquiry.
32  Petetin, L. (2018). Post-Brexit agricultural support and the WTO: Using both the amber and green boxes? Brexit 
& Environment Network.
33  Petetin, L., & Dobbs, M. (2018). Written evidence submitted to National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, 
Environment and Rural Affairs Committee: UK Agriculture Bill inquiry.
34 Farmers Guardian (2019). Anger over Government refusal to pay farmers to improve soil health post-Brexit.
35 Defra (2018). Health and harmony: The future for food, farming and the environment in a Green Brexit, p. 32.
36  Institute for European Environmental Policy (2018). Comparison of the emerging agricultural policy 
frameworks in the four countries. 
37  Dobbs, M., Petetin, L., & Gravey, V. Written evidence submitted to Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee: Scrutiny of the Agriculture Bill inquiry; Dobbs, M., Gravey, V., & Petetin, L. (2018). Written evidence 
submitted to Northern Ireland future agricultural policy framework, inquiry by DAERA; Petetin, L., & Dobbs, 
M. (2018). Written evidence submitted to National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, Environment and 
Rural Affairs Committee: UK Agriculture Bill inquiry; Petetin, L. (2018). Written evidence submitted to Scottish 
Government consultation: Support for agriculture and the rural economy - post Brexit transition.  
38  Engel, A., & Petetin, L. (2018). International obligations and devolved powers – ploughing through competences 
and GM crops. Environmental Law Review 20(1), 16-31.
39  Petetin, L., & Dobbs, M. (2018). Written evidence submitted to National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, 
Environment and Rural Affairs Committee: UK Agriculture Bill inquiry.
40  Petetin, L., & Dobbs, M. (2018). Written evidence submitted to National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, 
Environment and Rural Affairs Committee: UK Agriculture Bill inquiry.
41  Petetin, L. (2019). Oral evidence given to National Assembly for Wales, External Affairs and Additional 
Legislation Committee: Seminar session on international agreements.
42  Davis, J., Feng, S., Patton, M., & Binfield, J. (2017). Impacts of alternative post-Brexit trade agreements on UK 
agriculture: Sector analyses using the FAPRI-UK Model. The study’s trade liberalization model assumes that EU 
Free Trade Agreements are rolled over and that the UK can still benefit from preferential trade terms.
43 Hubbard, C., Moxey, A., & Harvey, D. (2019). Brexit: Farming on the edge? UK in a Changing Europe. 
44 HM Revenue & Customs (2019). Tax Information and Impact Note for the UK Tariff 2019.
45  Spanish Government (2013). Law 12/2013, of 2 August, measures to improve the functioning of the food supply 
chain.
46  Spanish Government (2013). Law 12/2013, of 2 August, measures to improve the functioning of the food supply 
chain.
47  Edwin, E. (2016). Certified translation: Spanish Code of Good Business Practices in Food Contracting. In April 
2019, Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading 
practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, p. 
59–72 entered into force. EU Member States have until 2021 to transpose the directive.
48  Amat Llombart, P. (2016). Buenas prácticas mercantiles en la contratación alimentaria: códigos y 
autorregulación. In: Temas actuales de derecho agrario y alimentaria (pp. 15-35). Valencia, Spain: UPV.
49 UK Government (2019). Groceries Code Adjudicator.
50 UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2009). Groceries Supply Code of Practice.
51 Sustain (2019). A fair and transparent supply chain.
52 Sinibaldi, A. (2018). Sustainability, biodiversity and territory: The Social Agriculture role. Interreg Europe. 
53 See Forum Nazionale Agricoltura Sociale.
54 Italian Government (2015). Act 141 of 18 August 2015 on provisions on social farming.  
55 Osservatorio Agroalimentare (2019). The National Social Agriculture Observatory is operational.
56  AGRIPSI (forthcoming 2019) Developing social agriculture in Tuscany: Recommended and guidelines (In 
Italian). 
57  AGRIPSI (forthcoming 2019) Developing social agriculture in Tuscany: Recommended and guidelines (In 
Italian). 
58  Ajates Gonzalez, R., Thomas, J., & Chang, M. (2018). Translating agroecology into policy: The case of France 
and the United Kingdom. Sustainability, 10(8), 1-19.
59  Ajates Gonzalez, R., Thomas, J., & Chang, M. (2018). Translating agroecology into policy: The case of France 
and the United Kingdom. Sustainability, 10(8), 1-19.
60 French Ministry of Agriculture, Agrifood, and Forestry (2016). The Agroecology Project in France, p. 4.
61  Champs Culturels (2018). The Agroecological transition: A new human-nature paradigm? New perspectives, 
new practices (In French).
62  Simonneaux, J. (2018). Didactics and the agroecological transition: Questions, issues, obstacles and ways 
forward (In French).  
63 French Government (2019). Groups of economic and environmental interest (In French). 
soilassociation.org38 39REEN BREXIT
64 Deloitte & France Nature Environnement (2017). Agroecology: Performance is everyone’s business! (In French). 
65 French Ministry of Agriculture and Food (2017). Infographic – Farmers’ perception of agroecology (In French). 
66 DAERA (2018). Statistical Review of Northern Ireland Agriculture 2017.
67 Food and Agriculture Organization (2015). Agroforestry: Definition. 
68  Cardinael, R. Chevallier, T., Germon, A., Jourdan,, C., Dupraz, C., Barthès, B., Bernoux, M., & Chenu, C. (2015). 
Agroforestry for a climate-smart agriculture – a case study in France. 
69 Soil Association (2018) ‘Agroforestry in England: Benefits, barriers and opportunities
70  Mosquera-Losada, M.R., Santiago Freijanes, J.J., Pisanelli, A., Rois, M., Smith, J., den Herder, M., Moreno, 
G., Malignier, N., Mirazo, J.R., Lamersdorf, N., Ferreiro Domínguez, N., Balaguer, F., Pantera, A., Rigueiro-
Rodríguez, A., Gonzalez-Hernández, P., Fernández-Lorenzo J.L., Romero-Franco, R., Chalmin, A., Garcia 
de Jalon, S., Garnett, K., Graves, A., & Burgess, P.J. (2016). Extent and success of current policy measures to 
promote agroforestry across Europe. 
71  Agriculture Chambers France (2017). 10 misconceptions about agroforestry - a review before you start (In 
French); Paris, P., Camilli, F., Rosati, A., Mantino, A., Mezzalira, G., Dalla Valle, C., et al. (2019). What is the future 
for agroforestry in Italy? Agroforestry Systems.
72  Santiago-Freijanes, J. J., Pisanelli, A., Rois-Díaz, M., Aldrey-Vázquez, J. A., Rigueiro-Rodríguez, A., Pantera, A., et 
al. (2018). Agroforestry development in Europe: Policy issues. Land Use Policy, 76, 144–156. 
73 French Ministry of Agriculture and Food (2018). Agroforestry and signs of quality: a winning duo! (In French). 
74  French Ministry of Agriculture and Food (2018). Agroforestry enthusiasts, participate in the Trees of the Future 
Contest! (In French). 
75  French Ministry of Agriculture and Food (2019). #SIA2019: Awards presentation for the “Agro-ecological 
Practices - Agroforestry” competition (In French).
76  French Ministry of Agriculture and Food (2018). Agroforestry and tenancy agreements: Knowledge support and 
recommendations for the drafting of rural tenancy agreements (In French). 
77 Measure 222 – first establishment of agroforestry systems on agricultural land.
78  Santiago-Freijanes, J. J., Pisanelli, A., Rois-Díaz, M., Aldrey-Vázquez, J. A., Rigueiro-Rodríguez, A., Pantera, A., et 
al. (2018). Agroforestry development in Europe: Policy issues. Land Use Policy, 76, 144–156.
79 Lang, T. (2018). The new Agriculture Bill has no vision for food. The Green Alliance Blog. 
80  Copenhagen Municipality Technical and Environmental Administration (2009). Eco-Metropolis, Our vision for 
Copenhagen 2015.
81 Organic Denmark (2018). UN award for Denmark’s Organic Plan. 
82  Sørensen, N. N., Tetens, I., Løje, H., & Lassen, A. D. (2016). The effectiveness of the Danish Organic Action Plan 
2020 to increase the level of organic public procurement in Danish public kitchens. Public Health Nutrition, 
19(18), 3428–3435.
83 Food for Life (2019). Schools.
84 Defra (2015). A plan for public procurement: food and catering: the balanced scorecard.
85 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018). Special report: Global warming of 1.5° C.
86  Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019). IPBES Global 
Assessment.
87 Committee on Climate Change (2019). Net Zero – The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming.
88  Lóránt, A., & Allen, B. (2019). Net-zero agriculture in 2050: how to get there? Brussels: Institute for European 
Environmental Policy.
89  The Independent (2019). Farming chief calls for ‘net zero’ agriculture emissions in UK by 2040;  Farmers 
Guardian (2019). NFU sets out three-pillar approach to achieve net zero emission goal by 2040.
90  Poux, P., & Aubert, P.M. (2018). An agroecological Europe in 2050: Multifunctional agriculture for healthy eating 
- Findings from the Ten Years For Agroecology (TYFA) Modelling Exercise. Paris: IDDRI. 
91  Ajates Gonzalez, R., Thomas, J., & Chang, M. (2018). Translating agroecology into policy: The case of France 
and the United Kingdom. Sustainability, 10(8), 1-19.
92 Stokstad, E. (2018). France’s decade-old effort to slash pesticide use failed. Will a new attempt succeed? Science.
93  Poux, P., & Aubert, P.M. (2018). An agroecological Europe in 2050: Multifunctional agriculture for healthy eating 
- Findings from the Ten Years For Agroecology (TYFA) Modelling Exercise. Paris: IDDRI. Pp., 13, 74.
94 Poux, P., & Aubert, P.M. (2018), p. 22.
95  Baker, C. (2018). Obesity statistics. House of Commons Library: Briefing Paper; Public Health England (2017). 
Health matters: obesity and the food environment. 
Petetin, L., Gravey, V. and Moore, B. 2019. 
Setting the Bar for a Green Brexit in Food and Farming 
(Soil Association, 2019).
This report was commissioned by the Soil Association and written by Ludivine 
Petetin, Viviane Gravey and Brendan Moore on behalf of the Brexit and 
Environment network, a network of academic experts analysing how Brexit  
is affecting the environment. 
Dr Ludivine Petetin is a Lecturer in Law at the School of Law and Politics of 
Cardiff University and an associate of the Brexit & Environment network. Her 
expertise lies in the areas of agri-environmental issues and international trade. 
Recently, her research focuses on the impact of Brexit, considering the potential 
challenges for agriculture, food and environmental law, policy and governance 
across the UK, and the specific challenges for Wales. She regularly engages with 
governments, legislatures and stakeholders across the UK on these matters.
Dr Viviane Gravey is co-chair of the Brexit & Environment network. She is a 
Lecturer in European Politics at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy 
and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast. Her expertise lies in the area of 
European environmental and agricultural policies and, more recently, on the 
challenges that Brexit poses for environmental policy and governance in a 
devolved UK, with a focus on Northern Ireland. She regularly engages with with 
governments, legislatures and stakeholders across the UK on these matters.
Dr Brendan Moore is network coordinator for Brexit & Environment. He is 
a Senior Research Associate at the School of Environmental Sciences at the 
University of East Anglia. His expertise lies in the area of climate change policy, 
with a particular interest in the EU Emissions Trading System and in UK climate 
policy after Brexit. 
soilassociation.org40
www.soilassociation.org
Soil Association
Spear House, 51 Victoria Street, 
Bristol BS1 6AD
0300 330 0100 | 0117 314 5001
